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Are some cosmologists trying to return human beings to the centre of the cosmos? In the view 
of some critics, the so-called “anthropic principle” is a desperate attempt to salvage a scrap of 
dignity for our species after a few centuries of demotion at the hands of science. It is all things 
archaic and backwards – teleology, theology, religion, anthropocentrism – trying to sneak back 
in scientific camouflage. We argue that this is a mistake. The anthropic principle is not mere 





In the 1930s, the Nobel-Prize-winning 
physicist Paul Dirac was pondering strange 
coincidences between the fundamental 
numbers of nature (Dirac 1938). He worked 
out the ratio of the electromagnetic force to the 
gravitational force between an electron and 
proton in an atom and got a huge number: 
1040. He also worked out the ratio of the age of 
the universe to the time it takes for electrons to orbit 
in an atom and got another huge number: 1039. 
Curiously, these numbers are similar. Maybe 
it’s just a coincidence, or maybe — Dirac 
thought — it’s a clue to deeper laws of nature. 
 
In the early 1960s, astronomer Robert Dicke 
compellingly argued that it was neither (Dicke 
1961). He realised that there is something usual 
about Dirac’s relation, something hiding inside 
one of the quantities: us. Like all of us, the 
universe is getting older. So, the age of the universe 
in Dirac’s second ratio isn’t a fundamental 
constant. It’s the time between the beginning 
of the universe and us, here, now, today. Any 
account of the coincidence must consider how 
the Universe makes beings that are capable of 
measuring its age. 
 
Dicke realised that we cannot be living at any 
random time in the universe. Firstly, in its 
youth, the cosmos was a featureless sea of the 
simplest atoms, hydrogen and helium. The 
elements needed for life — from the carbon 
that provides the backbone for organic 
molecules, to the calcium that provides the 
backbone for our backbones — are formed in 
nuclear reactions at the hearts of stars and are 
recycled by stellar winds and supernova 
explosions into planets, and ultimately life. 
Secondly, in the dim and distant future, most 
of the stars have died, and the energy to sustain 
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life becomes rare. The building blocks for 
planets and people are entombed in the ever-
cooling cores of stars or inside black holes. 
Life, in this distant future universe, would be 
precarious, and probably much rarer than 
today. 
 
Putting these two facts together, given that life 
exists at all, we should not be surprised to find 
that when we measure the age of the universe, 
we get an answer that is greater than (but not 
too much greater than) the lifetime of a star. 
When we express this relation in terms of the 
fundamental constants (using a simple model 
for stars), we get Dirac’s coincidence. 
 
It is a mistake to think that Dicke is saying that 
our time in the universe is “special,” that “our 
Universe stands at a ‘golden interval’, neither 
too young nor too old, but just right.”1 Rather, 
Dicke is employing a basic principle of the 
scientific method: what you observe depends 
on what you are looking at and what you are 
looking with. When it comes to the universe, 
we are not Dr Frankenstein, setting up our 
scientific equipment when and where we 
please. We are the monster: we have woken up 
in the middle of the contraption that made us 
and are trying to understand how it all works. 
 
Looking through our eyes 
The natural question for cosmologists and 
physicists to ask next is: what else about our 
universe could be explained in this way? What 
combination of fundamental laws and our 
necessarily limited perspective best accounts 
for our observations of the universe? 
 
In search of the answer, physicists delved into 
the deepest properties of nature, including the 
masses of the fundamental particles and the 
 
1  “Anthropic arrogance,” David P. Barash, Aeon: 
aeon.co/essays/why-a-human-centred-universe-is-not-a-
humane-one 
strengths of the fundamental forces. By 
considering other hypothetical universes, it 
was found that slight deviations in these 
fundamental properties often result in dead 
and sterile universes that lack the complexity 
necessary for life (for a recent review, see 
Adams 2019). This is known as the 
cosmological fine-tuning problem: the ability 
of the fundamental laws of our universe to 
provide the right conditions for life of any 
conceivable kind is a seemingly very rare talent 
indeed. As summarised in our recent book A 
Fortunate Universe: Life in a finely tuned cosmos 
(2016), many small changes have disastrous 
effects. If the strong force were slightly weaker 
or the fundamental masses slightly heavier, the 
periodic table would not exist. If gravity were 
weaker or the universe expanded too fast, 
matter would not form into stars to forge 
elements, or indeed make any structure at all. 
Such a universe would be too simple, too 
short-lived, or too empty to ever host life. 
 
Note well: we have arrived here without any 
assumptions about human specialness or 
religious jiggery-pokery. Saying that the 
universe is “fine-tuned for life” is not to say 
that it has a fine-tuner! It is only to say that 
there is something rare about the physical 
parameters that life requires. We’re just doing 
science. Fine-tuning for life has been studied 
by physicists for decades, using the best 
theoretical tools available, and published in 
peer-reviewed journals.  
 
Other Life-forms and Other Universes 
Wait a minute, we hear you say. How can you 
make such sweeping statements about life and 
universes when we don’t have a good 
definition of what life is, and we don’t know 
what other universes are even possible?  
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For the first objection, we reply that the fine-
tuning for life is really the fine-tuning for the 
complexity required by life. We don’t assume 
that another possible way the universe could 
have been is life-prohibiting because we 
couldn’t live there. The kind of life-prohibiting 
disasters that await in other universes are the 
non-existence of chemistry, or indeed, any way 
at all to stick two particles together. Or a 
universe that ends before anything could stick 
together. Or a universe that expands so fast 
that no two things have any chance of sticking 
together. This is a long way from the debate 
over whether a virus is alive. 
 
But how do we know that these other 
universes are possible? As the ANU’s Charley 
Lineweaver has pointed out to us, “There is no 
fine-tuning if there are no knobs.” But think 
about that claim for a moment. These other, 
life-prohibiting universes are perfectly 
mathematically consistent. So who took the 
knobs away? A deeper physical law? Great! 
What is it? And why is it a physical law that 
allows life forms, rather than one that doesn’t? 
In the words of Carr and Rees (1979), “even if 
all apparently anthropic coincidences could be 
explained [by some presently unformulated 
physical theory], it would still be remarkable 
that the relationships dictated by physical 
theories happened also to be those propitious 
for life.” 
 
Perhaps something deeper than the laws of 
nature took the knobs away, like a 
metaphysical principle? Great! What is it? And 
why is it a metaphysical principle that allows 
life forms, rather than one that doesn’t? And 
what a stunning comeback for armchair 
philosophy! Scientists have been toiling for 
centuries, learning about the universe by 
actually measuring it. But all this time, we could 
have been deriving the mass of the electron 
from some a priori philosophical principle with 
a deep affinity for the number 4.185463	 ×
	10!"# (the electron mass in Planck units). 
 
Whence the Anthropic Principle? 
The term “anthropic principle” comes from a 
presentation by astrophysicist Brandon Carter 
in 1973, at a celebration of Copernicus’s 500th 
birthday. Building upon the insights of Dicke 
and others, Carter argued that our position in 
time and space must be taken into account in 
our scientific theorising about the world, 
noting that: 
 
Although our situation is not 
necessarily central, it is inevitably 
privileged to some extent. 
  
Carter is echoing Dicke’s insight: there are 
times and places in our universe where life is 
overwhelmingly more likely to exist, and so 
our perspective on the universe is necessarily 
limited. This is what Carter called the weak 
anthropic principle. 
 
Carter also proposed a strong anthropic principle: 
 
The Universe (and hence the 
fundamental parameters on which it 
depends) must be as to admit the 
creation of observers within it at 
some stage. 
 
This principle is liable to be misunderstood 
due to the word “must.” Its sense here is 
consequential, as in “there is frost on the 
ground, so it must be cold outside.” We are 
physical life forms capable of measuring the 
universe, but not all fundamental laws allow 
for such things. Carter’s strong anthropic 
principle is not proposing that our existence 
causes the universe’s fundamental properties, or 
that any deep metaphysical principle or divine 
being was involved. 
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Here’s where the confusion starts: others have 
not followed Carter. In 1986, physicists John 
Barrow and Frank Tipler published the 
influential book, The Cosmological Anthropic 
Principle. They brilliantly explained how the 
overall properties of the cosmos, the details of 
the fundamental particles, and the forces that 
bind them together combine to produce the 
complexity and energy necessary for life. 
 
But on the anthropic principle, Barrow and 
Tipler muddied the waters by giving the same 
term a different definition. They proposed a 
weak anthropic principle that combines 
Carter’s strong and weak principle: 
 
The observed values of all physical 
and cosmological quantities are not 
equally probable but they take on 
values restricted by the requirement 
that there exist sites where carbon-
based life can evolve and by the 
requirement that the Universe be old 
enough for it to have already done so. 
 
This is Dicke’s insight. So far, so good. But 
Barrow and Tipler proposed a new strong 
anthropic principle, one that sounds similar to 
Carter’s strong principle, except that the word 
“must” is now given full speculative licence. 
Perhaps, they say, the universe has a designer, 
or “observers are necessary to bring the 
Universe into being.”  This version of the 
strong anthropic principle is metaphysical. 
 
So, now we have two versions of the weak 
anthropic principle and two versions of the 
strong anthropic principle, those from Carter 
and those from Barrow and Tipler. Confusion 
was inevitable. 
 
In addition, Barrow and Tipler added yet more 
“anthropic principles,” such as the Final 
Anthropic Principle: “Intelligent information-
processing must come into existence in the 
universe, and, once it comes into existence, it 
will never die out.” The dominant form of life 
over the history of the universe would be some 
kind of über-computer, digital 
consciousnesses enjoying an everlasting virtual 
reality paradise. This is, to put it mildly, 
speculative. 
 
Thus, Carter’s important and necessary idea 
has become both associated with disreputable 
and speculative company. Understandably, 
many scowl whenever the anthropic principle 
is mentioned. The feeling is that the anthropic 
principle is at best tautological and invoking it 
to explain any feature of our Universe is “the 
last refuge of the scoundrel.” And, at worst, 
the principle is untestable conjecture. 
 
Are we a puddle in a hole? 
The question is: what do we do with the fine-
tuning of the universe for life? Does (Carter’s) 
anthropic principle explain why a life-
permitting universe exists? 
 
Douglas Adams, in his posthumously 
published book The Salmon of Doubt (2002), 
famously lampooned the attempt to argue 
from the features of our environment to any 
greater cosmic purpose: 
 
This is rather as if you imagine a 
puddle waking up one morning and 
thinking, “This is an interesting world 
I find myself in — an interesting hole 
I find myself in — fits me rather 
neatly, doesn’t it? In fact it fits me 
staggeringly well, must have been 
made to have me in it!” This is such a 
powerful idea that as the sun rises in 
the sky and the air heats up and as, 
gradually, the puddle gets smaller and 
smaller, frantically hanging on to the 
notion that everything’s going to be 
alright, because this world was meant 
to have him in it, was built to have 
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him in it; so the moment he 
disappears catches him rather by 
surprise. I think this may be 
something we need to be on the 
watch out for. 
 
Adams is a favourite of ours, and on one level, 
this pithy story nicely illustrates the approach 
of Dicke: be mindful of the process that made 
you when you try to understand your 
environment. We are not detached observers 
of the universe, but are part of it, formed and 
shaped by its physical laws and our immediate 
cosmic habitat. Given that we exist at all, we 
should not be surprised that life-sustaining 
environments exist, even though the majority 
of the universe is inhospitable to human life. 
 
But some have pushed the accusation of 
“puddle thinking” too far, supposing that it 
solves the fine-tuning puzzle. 
 
Consider more closely the puddle’s reasoning. 
Let’s name our puddle Doug. He has noticed a 
precise match between two things: 1) his shape 
and 2) the shape of the hole in which he lives. 
Doug is amazed! What Doug doesn’t know is 
that, given A) the fluidity of water, B) the 
solidity of the hole, and C) the constant 
downward force of gravity, he will always take 
the same shape as his hole. If the hole had been 
different, his shape would adjust to match it. 
Any hole will do for a puddle. 
 
This is precisely where the analogy fails: any 
universe will not do for life. Life is not a fluid. 
It will not adjust to any old universe. There 
could have been a completely dead universe: 
perhaps one that lasts for 1 second before 
recollapsing or is so sparse that no two 
particles ever interact in the entire history of 
the universe. 
 
Think about the real explanation to Doug’s 
observation: A (fluid water) + B (solid hole) + 
C (gravity). If the puddle analogy applies to 
fine-tuning, what corresponds to A+B+C? 
What explains the match between what our 
universe does and what life requires? The 
puddle analogy doesn’t say. Invoking the 
puddle against fine-tuning is essentially saying 
“perhaps a solution exists.” Well, OK, sure, 
thanks for that, but what could that solution 
be? Maybe you could go one step further by 
filling in the blank in the following claim: a 
universe permits the possible existence of life 
because ___________. 
 
Here’s the thing: Doug is right to think that the 
match between his shape and the shape of the 
hole is worthy of explanation. He is not 
arrogant to look for an explanation. He would 
be unwise to dismiss without good reason the 
supposition that he is designed for the hole; 
after all, if Doug talked to his pals Lock and 
Key, they too would tell him of their 
remarkable matching shapes. We understand 
the puddle; we understand a lock and key; we 
want to understand fine-tuning for life. But 
“puddle thinking” is often used as an excuse to 
dismiss fine-tuning as unworthy of our 
attention at all. Even Doug knows better than 
that! 
 
A fine-tuning puzzle 
The real conundrum of life in the Universe is 
not: given that we are here, why do we find 
ourselves in a universe with the conditions that 
allow us to be here? The puzzle is: why does a 
universe with the ability to support life exist at 
all? 
 
This question is uncomfortable for many 
because it takes us to the edge of physics. If we 
ever uncover the ultimate properties of 
physical reality, we will have reached the end 
of physical explanations. Either the universe is 
as it is for no reason, or we must look for a 
reason beyond physics. The debate is 
unavoidable but necessarily philosophical. 
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Some invoke a divine mind, a “fine-tuner” 
who configured the universe to allow us to be 
here. Perhaps ours is a synthetic universe, 
whose conditions were chosen by a 
programmer who wants to simulate an 
interesting universe. 
 
Another live option is the multiverse, the 
notion that our universe is one of many, each 
with their own physical laws and conditions. In 
many proposed models of a multiverse, most 
universes are dead and sterile, but with enough 
spins of the cosmic roulette wheel, the right 
conditions for life should show up 
somewhere. We should not be surprised to 
find ourselves in one with physical conditions 
that allow us to be here. 
 
At the moment, the multiverse is a rough 
sketch of a scientific theory, or more exactly, a 
collection of sketches. If we had a rigorous 
multiverse theory, we could predict the variety 
of generated universes and see whether our 
universe is rare or common. Just as 
importantly, we could ask: are life-permitting 
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